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I. INTRODUCTION

Complete the following paragraph:
Inside the Supreme Court of the United States, the silence was
deafening. All eyes focused on the Justice about to speak, for his vote
would be decisive on the issue at hand. At stake was nothing less than the
presidency of the United States. The Republican candidate, though trailing
in the popular vote, appeared to have the electoral votes necessary for
victory until the Democrats challenged the results. Advocates for both
sides presented evidence and argument, focusing on the disputed vote
count in Florida. Now it was time to decide, and all waited for the opinion
of this Republican appointee. He was the third choice of his party for the
bench after two failed nominations, and his record on the Court made it
difficult to predict what he would say. His colleagues on both sides of the
issue leaned forward in a mixture of anticipation and dread as he began to
speak. His name was
If you said Anthony Kennedy, you would be half right.' But Bush v.
Gore2 was not the "first time in American history"3 that a single justice
decided who would be the next President of the United States. Long before
anyone knew what a "dangling chad" was - 1877 to be exact - it fell
upon the shoulders of Justice Joseph P. Bradley to decide which candidate
won the electoral vote of Florida.
The Electoral Commission of 1877, of which Justice Bradley was a
member, does not appear in most constitutional law textbooks or Supreme
Court histories.4 Yet, it is perhaps the most relevant "case" upon which to
1.Assuming that the conventional wisdom that Justice Kennedy provided the decisive vote
and authored the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore is correct. See, e.g., DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE
ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 284-85 (2001); Jeffery Rosen, In Lieu of Manners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2001, (Magazine), at 50.
2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justicibble, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093,
1093 (2001); see also Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional
History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2001) ("On December 12, 2000, the United States Supreme
Court, for the first time in its history, picked a president."); but see What We '11 Remember in 2050:
9 Views on Bush v. Gore, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 5, 2001 (quoting Eric Maltz as saying of
Bush v. Gore and the Electoral Commission of 1877 that "[in both cases, the resolution of the

dispute turned on the views of a single justice of the Supreme Court").
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT, HOW IT WAS, How IT IS (1987).
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evaluate the decision in Bush v. Gore. At least one current Justice, Stephen
Breyer, understands this, for he explicitly referred to Justice Bradley in his
dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore.5 This Article focuses on Justice
Bradley, the Electoral Commission of 1877, and the Electoral Count Act
of 1887 in light of Justice Breyer's conclusions about the historical
legacies of these three elements. Rather than rehash the arguments before
the Court in Bush v. Gore, Part II assumes familiarity with that case6 and
begins instead with an executive summary of the events surrounding the
formation and activities of the Electoral Commission. This Part also
introduces Justice Bradley, commenting on his appointment to the Court,
his role on the Commission, and critiquing the literature evaluating his
performance in 1877. Also included in this Part is a brief legislative
history of the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 7 the basis for the now famous
"safe harbor" provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5.'
Part III of the Article hypothesizes what Justice Breyer hoped to
accomplish by referring to these mostly forgotten episodes in history, and
evaluates whether the facts support Justice Breyer's analysis. Of particular
interest are Justice Breyer's contention that "the participation in the work
ofthe electoral commission by five Justices, including Justice Bradley, did
not lend that process legitimacy"9 and his assertion that the legislative
history of the Electoral Count Act evinced a clear Congressional intent to
keep the courts out of the process."0 These conclusions are debatable and
deserve more attention than the dissenting opinion gives.
Part IV of the Article looks at Justice Breyer's dissent from a legal
realism perspective. It postulates that Justice Breyer purposely brought up
Justice Bradley in his dissent in the hopes of convincing Justice Kennedy
to change his vote. Obviously, the attempt was not successful, and this Part
both examines why it failed and explores the larger implications of a
blatant appeal to historical reputation as a basis for judicial decision
making. Both Justice Bradley and Justice Kennedy faced situations in
which they were damned if they did, and damned if they didn't, which
helps explain the paradox of Bush v. Gore - a decision that is both
difficult to defend and hard to assail.
5. Bush, 531 U.S. at 156-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Martin H. Belsky, Bush v. Gore - A Critique of Critiques, 37 TULSA L. REV.
45, 45-67 (2001) (recapping the case).
7. 24 Stat. 373 (Feb. 3, 1887).
8. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at III(per curiam); id. at 121 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id.
at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); id. at 148 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
9. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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THE LEGAL HISTORY: THE 1876 ELECTION, THE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION, JUSTICE BRADLEY, AND THE ELECTORAL

COUNT ACT OF

1887

A. A Foreseen Crisis: The Election of 1876
1. The Electoral Controversy
While George W. Bush and Al Gore each went to bed election night (or
likely the morning after) not knowing if he had won, Rutherford B. Hayes
went to bed on election night (Tuesday, November 7, 1876) certain that his
opponent, Samuel J. Tilden, had prevailed." But,
[t]he affair was not over.... Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, on his way home
from an after-theater supper, stopped at the nearly deserted Republican
National Committee headquarters in New York and made the initial
moves that would plunge the nation into a unique crisis.... He scanned

the returns, which gave Tilden New York, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Indiana, and apparently the entire South, with a plurality of about 250,000
votes and, it seemed, 203 electoral votes (with only 185 needed for
victory). But in these tallies, Sickles found a glimmer of hope. Hayes
could win if the Pacific slope, whose returns were not in, went for him
and if Republicans retained control of South Carolina, Florida, and
Louisiana .... [Hie telegraphed the following audacious message to

leading Republicans in South Carolina, Louisiana, Florida, and' Oregon:
2
"With your state sure for Hayes, he is elected. Hold your state."'
11. See generally ARI HOOGENBOOM, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES: WARRIOR & PRESIDENT, ch.
17 (1995), available at http://www.rbhayes.org/dispute.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2003) (discussing
the disputed election of 1876). In his diary, Hayes wrote, "The election has resulted in the defeat
of the Republicans after a very close contest.... I never supposed there was a chance for
Republican success.... But I took my way to my office as usual, Wed morning, and was master
of myself and contented and cheerful." HAYES: THE DIARY OF A PRESIDENT 1875-1881, at 47-48
(T. Harry Williams ed., 1964).
12. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 11. Sickles thus continued his historical legacy of being in the
right place at the wrong time (or the wrong place at the right time). See, e.g., BRUCE R. CATON,
NEVER CALL RETREAT (2001); SHELBY FOOTE,THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE: FREDERICKSBURG

TO MERIDIAN (1986) (discussing General Sickle's ill-conceived maneuver at the Battle of
Gettysburg); see also W.A. SWANBERG, SICKLES THE INCREDIBLE (1991); THOMAs KENEALLY,
AMERICAN SCOUNDREL: THE LIFE OF NOTORIOUS CIVIL WAR GENERAL DAN SICKLES (2002)

(detailing the life of General Sickles). Among the many examples are Sickles' acquittal for
murdering the son of Francis Scott Key - he apparently seduced Sickles' wife - and Sickle's
liaison with the deposed queen of Spain while serving as minister to that country during the Grant
administration. The latter episode "had given new meaning to the phrase 'foreign affairs."' ARi
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In the next few days, both parties claimed victory. 3 Tilden captured the
popular vote, but Hayes appeared to have the electoral votes necessary for
victory; the returns from Florida, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Oregon
were in dispute. 4 If Hayes won every elector in these states, he would be
president; one vote for Tilden would bring the opposite result.
Accusations of fraud at the ballot box and in the state canvassing
boards abounded. 5 Both sides dispatched prominent politicians to the
South to "oversee" the vote counting. 16 It soon became clear that two sets
HOOGENBOOM, THE PRESIDENCY OF RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 25 (1988).

13. Many newspapers declared Tilden the winner, only to later declare "Results Still
Uncertain." E.g., N.Y. TIMES (Ist ed.), Nov. 8, 1876, at Al. Florida was too close to call. See N.Y.
TIMES (2d ed.), Nov. 8, 1876, at Al. The 2000 election saw its fair share of "Dewey Defeats
Truman" headlines as well. See KAPLAN, supra note 1,at 28. Dissatisfaction with the media's
performance in 2000 quickly surfaced, eerily similar to the criticisms justifiably leveled against the
networks after the 2000 election. See, e.g., Thomas Nast, "Keep Cool!" Ten Days After the
Election, HARPER'S WKLY., Dec. 2, 1876, at 980. This political cartoon shows the artist seated in
a bathtub surrounded by news tickers reading "Hayes ... Tilden ... Hayes" and newspapers

entitled the "New York Sensation" and "The New York Changeable World." A wonderful
collection of political cartoons relating to the 1876 election is available at http://app.
harpweek.com/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2003).
14. See Leon Friedman, Joseph P. Bradley, in II THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 1181, 1191 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). The
Oregon controversy arose despite Hayes clearly having won the popular vote in that state because
one elector, Joseph Watts, previously held the position of postmaster, which arguably rendered him
ineligible to serve as an elector. At the behest of Democratic Party Chairman Abram Hewitt, the
governor of Oregon, Democrat Lafayette F. Grover, removed Watts and substituted a Democratic
elector, C.A. Cronin, in his place. See ALLAN NEVINS, ABRAM S. HEWITT, wITH SOME ACCOUNT
OF PETER COOPER 327 (1935). The other two electors refused to recognize this individual and
recertified Watts, casting all three electoral votes for Hayes. Governor Grover then sent his own
vote to Congress, two for Hayes and one for Tilden. See John Harrison, Nobody for President, 16
J.L. & POL. 699, 699 n.2 (2000); see also The Trouble in Oregon, available at http://
elections.harpweek.com/9Controversy/overview-controversy-2.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2003);
Thomas Nast, Cronin "Organized Himself," HARPER'S WKLY., Jan. 13, 1877, at 36, available at
http://app.harpweek.coml/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2003) (depicting Cronin setting out for Washington,
D.C. with his vote for Tilden, but encumbered by the constitutions of Oregon and the United States,
which Nast presumably thought prevented Cronin's vote from counting).
15. One of Tilden's nephews, William T. Pelton, reportedly tried to buy influence with the
return boards in Louisiana. See HOOGENBOOM, supra note 11, at 29. Tilden rebuked Pelton, who
turned his efforts elsewhere. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
16. See HOOGENBOOM, supra note II; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 12; see also Harrison,
supra note 14, at 714 n.34 (referring to the label "visiting statesmen" given to the political and legal
dream teams sent south in 1876-77). For example, the Republicans dispatched General Lew
Wallace (who later received fame for authoring Ben Hur); former Secretary of State James Baker
would play this role for his party in 2000. Wallace, however, was a little less partisan, writing to
his wife of the events in Florida that, "Nothing is so common as the resort to perjury, unless it is
violence - in short, I do not know whom to believe.... If we win, our methods are subject to
impeachment for possible fraud. If the enemy win, it is the same thing exactly." HOOGENBOOM,
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of returns would emerge from at least Florida and Louisiana, where
Democrats questioned the counts performed by Republican-dominated
canvassing boards. 7 The question: who would determine which votes to
count? Bernard Schwartz summed up the issue succinctly:
Legally speaking, the conflict arose because of a lacuna in the
Constitution with regard to the process of electing the President. Article
II provides for the selection of presidential electors under state laws, for
the casting of their votes, and for the certification of electors to the
President of the Senate. It then goes on. "The President of the Senate
shall, in the Presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted." But
counted by whom? The President of the Senate (who in 1876-1877 was
Thomas W. Ferry, a leading Republican), the two Houses separately
(leading to a deadlock, since the Senate had a Republican and the House
a Democratic majority), or the Houses jointly (in which case the
Democratic House would outvote the Republican Senate)? 8
2. The Failure of Congress to Resolve the Problem in Advance
The maelstrom over the 1876 election did not exactly catch the U.S.
Congress off guard. For example, a considerable uproar occurred over
whether or not to count the electoral votes of Georgia in the election of
1868." A similar difficulty arose with respect to the electoral vote of
Wisconsin in the election of 1857, when a snowstorm delayed the meeting
17. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 171(1993).
18. Id. Senator Christiancy offered a much less delicate assessment of the situation:
[S]o meager is the provision of the Constitution in reference to the counting of votes for
President and Vice-President of the United States, and so entirely blank is that instrument as
to any mode of deciding upon the authenticity or validity of the certificates, that it would
almost seem ... that our fathers in framing the Constitution must have acted upon the
Irishman's plan of constructing a cannon; which was to make first a large hole and then cast
the cannon around it.
4 CONG. REC. 1751 (Mar. 16, 1876).
19. The votes went to the Democratic candidates, but Georgia's legislature expelled its black
members, raising questions of the propriety of readmitting the State to the Union. In the end, the
votes would not affect the outcome of the election, and Congress punted on the issue, announcing
two sets of electoral returns. But when Representative Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts
objected to the vote of Georgia, the Senate retired, deliberated, and overruled his objection,
prompting great consternation on the part of many Representatives, who questioned the Senate's
ability to overrule the objection of a member of the House. See CHARLES FAHRMAN, FIVE JUSTICES
AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877, in VII HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 6-9 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., Supp. 1988). So, Grant won the
electoral college in 1868 by a count of 214-80, but he also triumphed 214-71 in the same college
in the same election! See id.

20031
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of that State's electors.2 ° It seemed quite possible that the 1876 election
would be close, and that a single state's electoral vote could decide the

election. Hence, the first bill introduced in the Senate during the first
session of the 44th Congress dealt with the counting of electoral votes. 2'
From these debates, it is clear that what most concerned the legislators was
the possibility of two 22sets of electoral returns, each purporting to be the

"true" vote of a state.

Who would determine which votes should count if the House and
Senate disagreed over which was the "true" certificate? In the ensuing
debate, three main proposals emerged. One posited that the Twelfth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the historical practice of the first
U.S. Congress lodged this power in the President of the Senate. 23 The
second idea was to refer the question to the House of Representatives,
voting by states.24 The third plan called for submission of the question to
a congressionally-appointed tribunal: two suggestions were to either the
President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, and Chief Justice, 25 or to the
Supreme Court as a whole.26 Proponents of the President ofthe Senate plan
argued that the counting of votes was a "ministerial" task,27 while those
favoring the latter two plans argued that the function was, in effect,
"judicial. 2 8

The last course received the most support, (notwithstanding Eric
Foner's assertion that "nobody thought of going to the Supreme Court to
decide the issue") 29 but none of the amendments passed. Instead, the
20. See Harrison, supra note 14, at 699 n.l.
21. S.1, 44th Cong., Ist Sess. (introduced Dec. 8, 1875).
22. See, e.g., 4 CONG. REc. 1666 (Mar. 13, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Morton).
23. See, e.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1803-04 (Mar. 20, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Randolph). Senator
Randolph relied upon the actions of Senator John Langdon, whom the First Congress elected
President of the Senate "for the sole purpose of opening and counting the vote for President and
Vice President of the United States." Id.(quoting CONG. GLOBE (1789)).
24. See, e.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1937 (Mar. 24, 1876) (proposed amendment of Sen. Cooper).
25. 4 CONG. REc. 1694 (Mar. 14, 1876) (remarks and proposed amendment of Sen.
Frelinghuysen).
26. E.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1879 (Mar. 22, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Burnside).
27. E.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1804 (Mar. 20, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Whyte).
The other day my friend from Indiana [Senator Morton] seemed incredulously to smile when
he asked me whether I considered it a ministerial duty to decide between two returns and I
said yes. I repeat it. There is not a canvasser of any State in this Union that does not have to
do that very thing, and yet everybody knows his office is ministerial.
Id.
28. E.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1755 (Mar. 16, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Howe) ("Therefore Ithink,
myself, that by the express letter of the Constitution this question [of a dispute over the electoral
vote] is a judicial question, and all the legislation you want is such as may simplify and expedite
the trial and determination of it.").
29. What We '1Remember, supra note 3.
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Senate originally passed a version that left open the question of what to do
in the case of joint returns and differing views of each House,3" but later
decided to reconsider this vote3 ' and therefore the issue never reached the
House of Representatives. Part III of this Article will further analyze the
arguments underlying the debates over the electoral counting controversy;
for now, it is enough to note that although the Senate clearly foresaw the
possibility of a crisis in the upcoming 1876 election,32 it failed to reach an
agreement on how to resolve the issue.
B. The Creationof the Electoral Commission of 1877
The fears of many Senators became reality after the 1876 election.
Anticipating objections to the certificates from Florida, South Carolina,
and Louisiana, Congress heatedly and hurriedly debated the procedure for
deciding which votes to count. The addition of a challenge to one of the
electors from Oregon3 3 further enflamed the issue; if Hayes failed to garner
every disputed electoral vote, Tilden would be the next president. Tensions
ran high; General William T. Sherman dispatched several battalions of
artillery to Washington, D.C., anticipating unrest there.34
The failure of the prior U.S. Congress to pass legislation dealing with
the issue now haunted that body and the nation. The President of the
Senate,35 Thomas Ferry, planned to resolve the discrepancies himself (and
in favor of Hayes).36 Democrats, who controlled the House of
Representatives, 37 naturally thought that the House should decide the issue
(and in favor of Tilden). 3' Not surprisingly, Tilden favored this plan as
well, while Hayes called for the President of the Senate to do the count,
30. 4 CONG. REc. 1945 (Mar. 24, 1876).
31. 4 CONG. REc. 2586 (Apr. 19, 1876).
32. See, e.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1673 (Mar. 13, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Bayard).
[Sltill we ought to contemplate the possibility that such an act [referring to uncertainty over
the electoral vote of a particular state] might have been the turning point in the choice of the
President and Vice President of this country ... or may be in 1876, or some year of the
future.

Id. (emphasis added).
33. See supra note 14.
34. See HOOGENBOOM, supra note 11.
35. The office ofthe Vice President was vacant, Henry Wilson having died in 1875, so Ferry
could claim the position. See Sidney I. Pomerantz, Election of 1876, in II HISTORY OF AMERICAN
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1789-1968, at 1379, 1412 (Arthur M. Schelsinger, Jr. ed., 1971).
36. See id at 1412-13.
37. As one of the Republican representatives stated sarcastically on the floor, "Would it not
be better, instead of having the House of Representatives decide, to have it delegated to the
[D]emocratic national convention of the preceding year?" 4 CONG. REc. 1674 (Mar. 13, 1876)
(remarks of Rep. Anthony).
38. See Pomerantz, supra note 35, at 1412.
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but endorsed a quo warranto action to the U.S. Supreme Court
immediately thereafter.39 A moderate Republican representative, George
McRary of Iowa, proposed a compromise: each House would establish a
special committee to recommend a procedure for dealing with the
incoming electoral returns.40
Interestingly, the plan would eventually pass due to overwhelming
Democratic support, while many Republicans, including Hayes, thought
it a bad idea. The Commission was thought to favor Democrats, who only
needed to prevail on one contested electoral vote to win the election. 4, Out
of the Senate's committee emerged a proposal 42 to create what became the
Electoral Commission of 1877, a fifteen-member body consisting of five
senators, five representatives, and five Associate 43 Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court. 44 The Electoral Commission Act of 187745 delegated to the
Commission the authority to, "by a majority of votes, decide whether any
and what votes from such State are the votes provided for by the
Constitution of the United States, and how many and what persons were
duly appointed electors in such State. 46
The Act essentially selected four of the five Justices, two Republicans
and two Democrats, and left to them the authority to select the fifth
39. HARRY BARNARD, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES AND His AMERICA 338 (1954).
40. H. Res. 128, 44th Cong., 5 CONG. REC. 650 (1876).
41. See, e.g.. BARNARD, supranote 39, at 362-63; HOOGENBOOM, supranote 12, at 38-39;
C. VANN WOODWARD, Reunion and Reaction 151 (1966) ("The vote on the Electoral Commission
bill clearly revealed in each house a strong Democratic support and a weak and divided Republican
sentiment for the measure.").
42. S. 1153, 44th Cong., 5 CONG. REC. 713-14 (1877).
43. The exclusion of the Chief Justice from consideration was not accidental: Chief Justice
Morrison R. Waite was known to be close to Hayes. See BARNARD, supra note 39, at 339;
HOOGENBOOM, supra note 12, at 38.
44. As is true of any account of the Electoral Commission, this Article is indebted to Charles
Fairman, whose detailed account of the Electoral Commission became a supplement to the Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States. FAIRMAN, supra note
19. The executive summary of events contained in this Part is hardly a substitute for that book.
Among the materials Fairman painstakingly researched are the 800+ page book published by the
44th Congress, Counting Electoral Votes, Proceedingsand Debates in Congress relating to the
Counting of Electoral Votes and the 1000+ page compendium, Proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and ofthe Two Houses ofCongress in JointMeeting relative to the Count ofElectoral
Votes cast December 6, 1876for the PresidentialTerm commencing March 4, 1877. See id. at 10,
57 n.9.
45. 19 Stat. 227 (Jan. 29, 1877) [hereinafter Electoral Commission Act].
46. Id.§ 2. The Commission would only undertake this inquiry in the event that the President
of the Senate received more than one return claiming to represent the true electoral tally for any
particular state. Technically, Congress could override a decision ofthe Commission, but it required
a concurrence of both Houses voting separately, an unlikely event since the Democrats controlled
the House and Republicans the Senate. Id.
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member.47 As there were only two Democratic Justices at the time (and
both were designated by the statute),48 the bill passed the Senate under the
assumption that Justice David Davis, a Lincoln appointee thought to be
independent of party affiliation, would be that fifth member. 49 Everyone
predicted that the rest of the Commission would divide along party lines,
So Davis would, in effect, be the deciding vote. But on the same day,5 ° the
Illinois legislature elected Justice Davis to the Senate,5 and he refused to

47. Id.
[T]he associate justices of the Supreme Court of the United States now assigned to the first,
third, eighth, and ninth circuits shall select, in such manner as a majority of them shall deem
fit, another of the associate justices of the said court, which five persons shall be members
of said commission.
Id. Congress therefore designated Justices Samuel Miller and William Strong (both Republicans)
and Justices Stephen Field and Nathan Clifford (both Democrats). The following members of
Congress also served on the Commission: for the Republicans, Senators George Edmunds of
Vermont, Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, and
Congressmen George Hoar of Massachusetts, and James A. Garfield of Ohio (who later became
President). The Democrats were Senators Allen G. Thurman of Ohio and Thomas Bayard of
Delaware, and Congressmen Henry B. Payne of Ohio, Josiah Abbott of Massachusetts, and Eppa
Hunton of Virginia. See HARPER'S WKLY., Feb. 17, 1877, at 130, available at http://app.
harpweek.com/ (last visited June 24, 2003). Thurman later resigned from the Commission due to
health reasons and was replaced by Senator Keman. Pomerantz, supra note 35, at 1414. As John
Harrison points out, the Commission was unconstitutional by modem separation-of-powers
doctrine. See Harrison, supra note 14, at 700 n.3. In keeping with the theme of Justice Breyer's
dissent, this Article will only signal out Justice Bradley in the main text. But see infra notes 94-98
(examining the fairness of this practice).
48. See supratext accompanying note 47. Note the parallel to the 2000 Court, which also had
only two Democratic appointees, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg. Ostensibly, the 1877 Court, like
the 2000 Court, had two "swing voters" - Bradley and Davis (playing the roles of O'Connor and
Kennedy).
49. See FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 54-55; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL TRADITION 91-92 (1988); Stanley I. Kutler, David Davis, in II THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 14, at 1045, 1052.
50. According to C. Vann Woodward, the bill passed the Senate in the early morning, and
word of Davis' election by the Illinois legislature reached Congress at two in the afternoon.
WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 153.
51. A coalition of Democrats and Independent"Greenbacks" in the Illinois legislature elected
Davis by a vote of 101-99. The Democrats were influenced by Tilden's nephew Pelton who thought
that if they helped elect Davis, the party would assuredly receive his vote on the Commission. See
supra note 15; see HOOGENBOOM, supra note 12, at 40. Pelton never considered that Davis might
be honorable enough to refuse to serve on the Commission, and his efforts backfired. Compare,
e.g., Thomas Nast, Compromise - Indeed!, HARPER'S WKLY., Jan. 27, 1877, at 64 with Thomas
Nast, A Truce - Not a Compromise, HARPER'S WKLY., Feb. 17, 1877, at 132, both available at
http://elections.harpweek. com/(last visited June 24,2003) (Nast, a Republican, initially disfavored
the creation of the Commission, but became much more optimistic with the news that Bradley and
not Davis would round out the body. Presumably, many of his compatriots felt the same way.).
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serve on the Commission.52 Nevertheless, the House passed the bill," and
the fifth and final spot then went to the "only remaining Supreme Court
Justice who could claim any pretense of impartiality," Joseph P. Bradley. 4
C. Justice Bradley andthe ElectoralCommission
1. Justice Bradley
He was a "desparately serious"" man, appointed to the Court in 1870
by President Grant. His appointment came only after the Senate's rejection
of Attorney General E. Rockwood Hoar and after the death of Grant's
second choice, President Lincoln's Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton
(Stanton died four days prior to his Senate confirmation vote).56 By 1877,
his most important decisions as a Justice were to uphold the Legal Tender
Act" - overruling the Court's recent decision in Hepburn v. Griswold5 '
- and to dissent from the Court's narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment offered in the Slaughterhouse Cases.9 At the time of the
52. Justice Breyer's dissent implies that Davis was serving in the Senate by the time the
Commission formed. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.98, 156 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But Davis
actually kept his seat on the Court until March 4, 1877. See Members of the Supreme Court ofthe
United States, available at www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited June 24,
2003). Davis refused to serve on the Commission because he felt that he could not decide the matter
impartially, since he owed his upcoming Senate seat to the Democrats. See BARNARD, supra note
39, at 364-65; see also FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 54.
53. Having vociferously supported the bill up to this point, the Democrats could not abandon
it at this late stage, as the Republicans gleefully realized. See FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 54;
WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 153.
54. Friedman, supra note 14, at 1191. The four Justices designated by statute informed
Congress that they had selected Justice Bradley as the fifth member on January 30, 1887. 5 CONG.
REc. 1122 (Jan. 31, 1877).
55. Jonathan Lurie, Mr. Justice Bradley: A Reassessment, 16 SETON HALLL. REV. 343, 345
(1986) (quoting Charles Fairman, The Education of a Justice: Justice Bradley and Some of His
Colleagues, 1 STAN. L. REV. 217, 229 (1949)).
56. Id. at 350-51 & nn.56-62. Like Justice Kennedy, Bradley was not known for his sense
of humor, nor was he the first choice of his party or his president for the Court. See, e.g., id. n.238.
57. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 554-570 (1870) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
58. 75 U.S. (18 Wall.) 603 (1869). The two new appointees, Bradley and Strong, joined with
the dissenters from Hepburn to form a new 5-4 majority in favor of the Legal Tender Act. See
Friedman, supra note 14, at 1187-88. Between 1869 and 1870, Congress increased the number of
justices from eight to nine, allowing President Grant to appoint two members to the Court in 1870.
See A. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS 370 (6th
ed. 1983).
59. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111-24 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Riding circuit, Justice
Bradley broadly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to protect "the right to pursue, unmolested,
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Electoral Commission, Justice Bradley was also aiding Chief Justice
Morrison Waite in forming the opinion sustaining government regulation
of private industry that the Court would issue in Munn v. Illinois.6 ° His
reputation for seriousness and integrity was such that Democrats trusted
that he could vote in their favor. They were also encouraged by the opinion
Bradley authored while riding circuit in Louisiana6 ' that declared the
Enforcement Act unconstitutional - a view later endorsed by the full
Court.6" The Chairman of the Democratic Party, Congressman Abram
Hewitt, received assurances to that effect from the two Democratic
Justices serving on the Commission.63 A newspaper of the day summed up
the conventional wisdom on Justice Bradley thusly:
The fear that the Republicans have is that Bradley is an intensely legal
man, even more legal than Republican, and that he will not hesitate to
give the Presidency to Tilden if the technical points should be in his favor.
...These

persons fear that Bradley is more lawyer than Republican, and

the Democrats fear that he is more Republican than lawyer."
Bradley reluctantly took his place on the Commission.65
a lawful employment in a lawful manner." Livestock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City
Livestock Lending & Slaughter House Co., 15F. Cas. 649,652 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408). This
view did not survive review by the full Court. See John Harrison, Reconstructingthe Privilegesor
Immunities Clause, 101 YALEL.J. 1385, 1414-16 (1992).
60. 94 U.S. 113 (1877); see FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 184-86; Friedman, supra note 14,
at 1189 (Justice Bradley's influence on the Munn opinion). Chief Justice Waite was not eligible to
serve on the Electoral Commission because the Act limited participation to the associate justices.
See Electoral Commission Act, § 2, 24 Stat. 373 (Feb. 3, 1887). Waite was not highly regarded,
even by members of his own party. See Lurie, supra note 55, at 351-52 & nn.69-72. This may
explain why he was specifically excluded from the Commission, although his closeness to Hayes
is a more likely explanation. See supra note 43.
61. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (1874) (No. 14,897). Bradley's opinion
limited the scope of the newly-passed Fourteenth Amendment by holding that where adequate state
remedies existed, federal ones were unconstitutional. See id. at 708-09; see Laurent B. Frantz,
CongressionalPower to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment Against PrivateActs, 73 YALE L.J.
1353, 1365-73 (1964) (critiquing Bradley's opinion in Cruikshank). Frantz argues that Bradley
would have found that private conduct that was racially-motivated could be actionable under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id at 1372-73. Regardless, many Democrats looked favorably upon
Bradley's appointment to the Commission since he was the "man 'who first knocked the bottom
out of the enforcement act."' WOODWARD, supranote 41, at 154 (quoting LOUISVILLE COURIER-J.,
Jan. 22, 1877).
62. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
63. Justices Field and Clifford. See Friedman, supranote 14, at 1191. Not all Democrats were
so optimistic. See N.Y. SUN, Feb. 1, 1877, at AI ("The almost absolute decision of the Presidential
question is left to Judge Joseph P. Bradley, a politician to whom the party never looked in vain.").
64. CI. TRmi., Feb 14, 1877, quoted in FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 124.
65. According to then-Representative Garfield, Justice Strong informed him that "all the
Judges except one were very sorry to be called to the Commission." See FAIRMAN, supra note 19,
at 57. The "one" was Justice Field, an ardent Democrat. Id.

BRADLEY. BREYER, BUSH AND BEYOND: THE LEGAL REALISM OF LEGAL HISTORY

2. The Electoral Commission of 1877
Per the statute,66 the U.S. Congress counted the electoral votes by state
in alphabetical order; the electoral vote of Florida was the first to go to the
Commission. 67 The Commission heard argument on the Florida returns on
February 2-3, 1877. The brother of one of the Justices on the Commission
argued the cause for the Democrats.68 The allegation was simple: the
Republican canvassing boards threw out votes so that they could certify
Hayes the winner. Attention focused on a specific county in Florida, from
which the Commission could infer similar fraud throughout the State.6 9
The Republican counter-argument boiled down to an equally clear
contention: the Commission did not have the authority to "go behind the
certification" issued in accordance with Florida law: the other two
certificates before the House were invalid.70 If the Commission did go
behind the certificate, the Republicans argued, they too could show fraud

and corruption that worked against their candidate. 7 The Democrats also
argued that a Hayes elector, one F.C. Humphreys, was ineligible because
he allegedly held another office - that of shipping commissioner.72 The
66. Electoral Count Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 373, § 4 (Feb. 3, 1887).
67. The two Houses of Congress met jointly to count the electoral votes on February 1, 1877.
See FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 57-58. The votes from Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
and Delaware entered without objection. Id. at 57. The teller then read three certificates from
Florida, two of which declared the State's four electoral votes for Tilden. Id. at 58. The other
certificate pledged the votes to Hayes. Id. at 59.
68. David Dudley Field, serving out an interim term as Congressman. See id at 57, 59-60.
69. Id. at 59-62. Representative Field focused on Baker County. See id. In the 2000 election,
Broward, Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties would rise to the headlines, although hindsight
indicates that Gore may have had success pursuing the issue of black disenfranchisement in Duval
County, Baker's neighbor. See KAPLAN, supra note I, at 76; see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Understandingthe ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA. L. REv. 1045, 1045-48 (2001).
70. FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 63-65. Adding to the confusion was the controversy in
Florida over the gubernatorial election. The incumbent, Republican Marcellus L. Stearns, was
declared the victor initially. His opponent, George F. Drew, brought suit claiming that the
Republican canvassing boards invalidated votes that would have resulted in his election. The
Supreme Court of Florida, on December 12, 1876, held that the Boards had usurped their authority,
resulting in Drew's election. Id. at 61-62. See State of Fla. ex rel. Drew v. McLin, 16 Fla. 17
(1876). In the interim, Governor Stearns certified the slate of electors for Hayes. When Drew took
office, he certified his own slate of electors (pledged to Tilden) on January 26, 1877. See FAIRMAN,
supranote 19, at 62-64; Pomerantz, supranote 35, at 1406. Before the Commission, the Democrats
argued that the Florida court's reasoning should apply to the presidential electors as well, although
the Commission expressly reflised to consider that issue. See id.
71. See FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 64. This parallels the Bush campaign's assertion that
irregularities in the counting of absentee ballots harmed their candidate. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra
note 1, at 157-65.
72. See FAMMAN, supra note 19, at 112-14.
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Commission retired on February 5 to consider the case; the members
announced their opinions two days later. The Congressmen went first, then
the Justices: "Judge Bradley arose at 2[:]13 to read his opinion. All were
intent, because B[radley] held the casting vote. It was a curious study to
watch the faces
as he read. All were making a manifest effort to appear
73
unconcerned.

Bradley, along with the other Republicans on the Commission, voted
not to allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence as to the validity of the
certificate. He crossed party lines, however, to allow the Democrats to
present evidence regarding the eligibility of Humphreys.7 4 After hearing
that evidence on February 8, the Commission voted 8-7 to declare the
certificate of Hayes electors the official electoral vote for Florida." From
February 10-28, this process played out, with slightly less drama, for the
other challenged states (Louisiana, 6 Oregon, and South Carolina); in every
instance the Commission voted 8-7 to declare the Hayes electors the
official votes." The U.S. Congress, despite filibuster attempts in the
Democratic-controlled House, finished counting the votes at 4:10 am, less
than two days before the inauguration.78
3. Reaction to Justice Bradley's Role: Contemporary and Historical
The press, in particular the New York Sun, singled out Justice Bradley
for abuse. According to the Democrats, the fix was in. 79 From these attacks
73. Id.at 95 (quoting the diary of Representative Garfield).
74. Id.
at 95-106 (quoting and commenting on Justice Bradley's opinion).
75. See id.
at 112-14. The evidence demonstrated that Humphreys certainly intended to resign
his commission, although technically he may not have done so, since he tendered his resignation
letter to a Judge whose court was not in session. See id The Commission decided, 8-7, that
Humphreys and the other Hayes electors were "duly appointed." Id.at 114.
76. The Commission's decision on Louisiana particularly upset the Democrats. The
allegations of fraud and irregularities were so abundant, it seemed that the Commission would have
to look behind the certificates, but it voted not to, 8-7. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 163;
see also Thomas Nast, A Jewel Among Swine, HARPER'S WKLY., Feb. 24, 1877, at 141, available
at http://elections.harpweek.coml (last visited June 24, 2003) (depicting New York City politico
John Morrissey face-to-face with a large pig; Morrissey allegedly claimed that he could buy the
Louisiana electors like he could buy pigs). Louisiana also had a conflicting set of gubernatorial
returns which complicated the process of certification. See Pomerantz, supra note 35, at 1406.
77. See generally FAtRMAN, supra note 19, at 116-120 (highlighting the remainder of the
Commission's proceedings). The Commission voted unanimously that the certificate for the
Democratic elector, Cronin, was invalid, but split on party lines on the question whether the
disputed Republican elector's vote should count. See supra note 14; see BARNARD, supra note 39,
at 376-77.
78. See 5 CONG. REC. 2068 (Mar. 2, 1877).
79. See J. Keppler, "The 'Democ-Rats' Caught in the PresidentialTrap," PUCK, Feb. 28,
1877, at 7, available at http://elections.harpweek.com/ (last visited June 24, 2003). In this cartoon,
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came the rumor that Bradley initially intended to vote in a manner
favorable to the Democrats on the Florida case, only to change his mind
after an evening in which his house "was surrounded by carriages"8 of
pro-Republican special interests, and in which his wife reportedly came
downstairs in her nightgown to implore him to change his vote.8' A mutual
associate of Tilden's and Bradley's wrote the former that as of January 30,
1877, Bradley intended to vote Tilden's way.82 Another oft-repeated rumor
had Bradley drafting an opinion in the Florida case going Tilden's way and
showing it to another Justice on the Commission.83 An even more serious
accusation, and one that received no corroboration, alleged that Bradley
sold his vote for $200,000." The harassment got so bad that Bradley took
the unusual step of publishing a public
explanation of his actions, although
85
it did little to mute the criticism.
the Democratic members of the Commission are depicted as rats caught in a trap formed by
caricatures of the Republican Commission members. See id. In the aftermath of Bush v. Gore,
political cartoons depicted similar themes. See, e.g., Tom Toles, These Robes Don't Cover
Everything, Do They?, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000 (on file with the author) (depicting a court
of two elephants and two donkeys wearing judicial robes and holding gavels).
80. The "surrounded by carriages" language comes from the ardently Democratic New York
Sun. Justice Breyer's dissent would indicate that Professor Woodward made this allegation, but
Woodward simply quoted the Sun's column of February 20, 1877, without taking a stand on the
allegation. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 156 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see WOODWARD,
supra note 41, at 159 n.26, 162.
81. WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 159-60 (1966); see FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 129

(quoting N.Y. SUN, Aug. 4, 1877). Bradley allegedly switched to the Republican side to curry favor
with the railroad interests he represented in private practice before his appointment to the Court.
See WOODWARD, supra 41, at 157-62.
82. See Lurie, supra note 55, at 354-55 & nn.95-98.
83. Justice Field. See FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 129-34. Several papers purported to
interview Justice Field and receive his tacit concurrence in this report. See id. While Justice Field
never expressly stated that this event did, in fact, occur, neither did he deny it. See id. Bradley's
diary entry for February 4, 1877 - a recess day for the Commission and the one before they voted
on the Florida certificates - states, "Justice Field called." Id.at 75.
84. See WOODWARD, supranote 41, at 156-57. This was the same amount for which Tilden's
nephew Pelton purportedly arranged to buy the vote of Louisiana. See id.
at 157; supra note 15.
85. See Lurie, supra note 55, at 355. The letter, published in the New Jersey Advertiser, on
September 5, 1877, read:
I perceive that the New York Sun has reiterated its charge that after preparing a written
opinion in favor of the Tilden electors in the Florida case, submitted to the Electoral
Commission, I changed my views during the night preceding the vote, in consequence of
pressure brought to bear upon me by Republican politicians and Pacific Railroad men, whose
carriages, it issaid, surrounded my house during the evening. This, I believe, is the important
point of the charge. Whether I wrote one opinion, or twenty, in my private examination of
the subject, is of little consequence, and of no concern to anybody, if the opinion which I
finally gave was the fair result of my deliberations, without influence from outside parties.
The above slander was published some time since, but I never saw it until recently, and
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Time has done little to settle the controversy over Justice Bradley's
role.86 In 1935, Professor Allan Nevins published a biography of
Congressman Abram Hewitt, the Chairman of the Democratic Party in
1876-77.87 Based on first-hand knowledge of Hewitt, the book alleged that
Bradley changed his mind the night before the Commission voted on the
Florida case. 8 Professor Charles Fairman later rebutted Nevins' account
in Five Justices and the ElectoralCommission,89 concluding that Hewitt
deemed it too absurd to need refutation. But as it is categorically repeated, perhaps Iought
to notice it. The same story about carriages of leading Republicans, and others, congregating
at my house, was circulated at Washington at the same time, and came to the ears of my
family, only to raise a smile of contempt. The whole thing is a falsehood. Not a single visitor
called at my house that evening; and during the whole sitting of the Commission, Ihad no
private discussion whatever on the subjects at issue with any person interested on the
Republican side, and but very few words with any person. Indeed, 1 sedulously sought to
avoid all discussion outside the Commission itself. The allegation that I read an opinion to

Judges Clifford and Field is entirely untrue. I read no opinion to either of them, and have no
recollection of expressing any. If I did, it could only have been suggestively, or in a
hypothetical manner, and not intended as a committal of my final judgment or action. The
question was one of grave importance, and, to me, of much difficulty and embarrassment.
I earnestly endeavored to come to a right decision, free from all political or other extraneous
considerations. In my private examination of the principal question (about going behind the
returns), I wrote and re-wrote the arguments and considerations on both sides as they
occurred to me, sometimes being inclined to one view of the subject, and sometimes to the
other. But I finally threw aside these lucubrations, and, as you have rightly stated, wrote out
the short opinion which I read in the Florida case during the sitting of the Commission. This
opinion expresses the honest conclusion to which I had arrived, and which, after a full
consideration of the whole matter, seemed to me the only satisfactory solution of the
question. And I may add, that the more I have reflected on it since, the more satisfied I have
become that it was right. At all events, it was the result of my own reflections and
considerations, without any suggestion from any quarter, except the arguments adduced by
counsel in public discussion, and by the members of the Commission in its private
consultations.
As for the insinuations contained in a recent article, published in a prominent periodical
by a noted politician [Jere S. Black, The Electoral Conspiracy,256 No. Am.REv. 1, 1-34
(1877)], implying that the case was decided in consequence of a political conspiracy, I can
only say (and from the peculiar position I occupied on the Commission I am able positively
to say) that it is utterly devoid of truth, at least, so far as the action of the Commission itself
was concerned....
quoted in FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 135-36. The denial left open the possibility that members of
the Commission visited Bradley before the day of the crucial vote. One of the allegations against
Bradley is that Senator Frelinghuysen, a Republican, called upon him the evening before the
Florida vote. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 14, at 1192.
86. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 49, at 91-92.
87. NEVINS, supra note 14.

88. Id. at 370-72.
89. FAHMAN, supranote 19. According to Fairman, "Professor Nevins' performance did not
measure up.... [H]e was wrong in putting faith in Hewitt's 'Secret History,' and in embellishing
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made up the story.9 ° To see the paradox of Justice Bradley's legacy, one
need look no further than Friedman and Israel's The Justices of the United
States Supreme Court,91 where one chapter notes that even "[i]f he
agonized about the answer and then switched his vote, such behavior is as
much consistent with an honest evaluation of the issues as a party dictated
decision,"92 while another chapter concludes summarily that "Bradley,
under immense pressure, succumbed and switched from favoring Tilden
to supporting Hayes."93
One's assessment of Bradley, it seems, depends upon one's degree of
cynicism. Part III will address this dichotomy and explain how it informs
the assessment of Justice Breyer's reference to Justice Bradley in his
dissent in Bush v. Gore. It is interesting to note that, with the possible
exception of ex-Justice Davis, who received criticism for his political
aspirations94 and for "shirking" his judicial duties in a time of great need,95
the other Justices on the Commission received little historical attention
for their roles on the Commission; to the extent their participation is
mentioned, it is largely uncritical.97

it in the process. He detracted from the good name of Justice Bradley. And he led into error
younger historians who trusted him." Id.at 173.
90. Id. at 164-73.
91. Supra note 14.
92. Friedman, supra note 14, at 1194.
93. William Gillette, Nathan Clifford, in II THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, supra note 14, at 963, 974. It is worth mentioning that Justice Davis, upon whom the
Democrats pinned their hopes originally, remarked in the safety of hindsight that he agreed with
Justice Bradley's opinion. See Kutler, supra note 49, at 1052. Sidney Pomerantz's account of the
Electoral Commission also concludes summarily that Bradley flip-flopped on the issue, essentially
echoing Hewitt's charges. See Pomerantz, supra note 35, at 1418-19.
94. See, e.g., Thomas Nast, Ex-Judge David Davis (Now Senator) at Home, HARPER'S
WKLY., Feb 17, 1877, at 121, available at http://elections.harpweek.com./ (last visited June 24,
2003). In this political cartoon, a bloated Davis sits at the intersection ofthe Supreme Court (where
a sign reads "Notice: No Politicians Wanted") and the Senate (where another sign reads "The
Senatorial Arena does not always land one at the White House"). Davis's former colleagues on the
Court likewise disproved of his political aspirations. When Davis became President pro tempore
of the Senate for a brief period in 1881, Chief Justice Waite reportedly remarked that he was "as
near to the Presidency as he can get." Kutler, supra note 49, at 1052. Davis served one term as
Senator, retiring in 1883. See id. at 1053.
95. See Kutler, supra note 49, at 1052 (discussing the New York Times article printed after
Davis died, accusing him of "irresponsibility").
96. They did, however, receive contemporary criticism. Justices Strong and Miller were hung
in effigy. See Stanley I. Kutler, William Strong, in IIJUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, supra note 14, at 1153, 1161. Justices Clifford and Field were attacked in the press for
refusing to attend President Hayes' inauguration. See Gillette, supra note 93, at 974.
97. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 93, at 974-75.
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Why Bradley should be taken to task for voting for Hayes while.., the
other Republican Supreme Court members on the commission did so
without censure shows how much more was expected of him. The matter
was so serious, the stakes so enormous, and the pressure on Bradley so
great, he could not have satisfied everyone with any decision he made.98
D. The ElectoralCount Act of 1887
The Electoral Commission of 1877 was certainly an ad hoc solution to
a potentially recurring problem. John Harrison argues that this is what
made it successful, as well as normatively supportable.9 9 Yet the ad hoc

nature of the solution meant that it was suitable for that "day and train
only.' ' "0 Over the next ten years, the U.S. Congress intermittently tried to
find the long-term solution to the electoral count problem that eluded it in
1876. In 1887, it finally passed the Electoral Count Act, but not before
considerable debate on the subject. The stumbling point remained what to
do in the event of multiple returns from a state with lack of agreement
between the House and Senate over which return was "true."'' 1
It was clear that the U.S. Congress would not institutionalize the
Electoral Commission, for even those who supported that route in 1876
had serious doubts about the constitutionality of that body,0 2 although
their assessments of its performance were largely supportive.'03 Although
To the credit of both Justices Clifford and Stephen Field... they performed a public service
by joining the electoral commission in the first place ....
In fact, Clifford's role in the
election controversy ... suggest[s] that there were moments when Clifford rose above
principle, prejudice, and even party to act the genuine patriot.

Id.
98. Friedman, supra note 14, at 1194; see also WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 162
("Bradley's son was within his rights, also, in complaining that his father was expected to be freer
from partisan bias than any of the other seven Republicans on the Commission.").
99. Harrison, supra note 14, at 714-15.
100. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 815 (Jan. 21, 1886) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
102. E.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1842 (Mar. 21, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Morton).
I say we cannot confer the jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court as aSupreme Court. Still if
we have the power to create a special tribunal we can confer it upon the judges of the
Supreme Court because they are judges of that court.... [But] I do not believe we have that
power.
Id. Despite thinking that the power to create a tribunal was beyond the Constitution, Senator
Morton, who was a Republican candidate for president prior to the party's convention, served as
a member of the Electoral Commission. See supra note 47.
103. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 815 (Jan. 21, 1886) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
That [an electoral crisis] was happily avoided by a contrivance - for 1cannot call it much
more, and I suppose Senators did not think it much more; I did not support it at the time, but
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several Senators maintained that the best course would be to refer disputed
electoral counts to the U.S. Supreme Court,"°4 the U.S. Congress
eventually passed the Electoral Count Act of 1887 which provided that,0 5
in the case of multiple electoral returns, and when the House and Senate
could not agree over which was the "true" certificate, the votes certified
by the "Executive of the State" would count."6 With the passage of that
Act, the issue disappeared from the national scene for a little over one
hundred years.
III. THE "LEGAL" ARGUMENT: JUSTICE BREYER'S
DISSENT IN BUSH V. GORE

The issue of disputed electoral counts re-emerged on the national scene
in 2000. The purpose of the analysis of Bush v. Gore in this Part is not to
critique the merits of the per curiam's equal protection argument, the
concurrence's interpretation of Article II, or the dissents' rebuttals of
either rationale. That has been done elsewhere. 7 This Part has a much
narrower focus: Part II of Justice Breyer's dissent, and the conclusions he
it was a wise measure - by which a solution was brought about of this difficulty without
producing actual convention and strife.
Id. at 815-17 (remarks of Sen. Sherman) ("Then it was that the plan of an electoral commission was
gotten up. I did not believe in the constitutionality of that plan. It was a wise solution of a great
difficulty; it operated well."); but see 17 CONG. REc. 1024 (Feb. 1, 1886) (remarks of Sen. Ingalls)
("The Electoral Commission of 1877 was a contrivance that will never be repeated in our politics.
It was a device that was favored by each party in the belief that it would cheat the other, and it
resulted, as I once before said, in defrauding both.").
104. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 1020 (Feb. 1, 1886) (remarks of Sen. Hoar) ("A perfect bill, as
I believe, would provide for a common arbiter between these two bodies [the House and
Senate].... I would prefer to take the seniorjustice of the Supreme Court, as John Marshall I think
proposed."); id. at 1022 (remarks of Sen. Hoar); see also id (remarks of Sen. Maxey) ("I would
rather take the Supreme Court of the United States, as much as I object to drawing that great
tribunal into this controversy, because that court would at least give a decision.").
105. Electoral Count Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 373 (Feb. 3, 1887).
106. Id. § 4.
107. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 (2001); RIcHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING
THE DEADLOCK (2001); THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass Sunstein &

Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting
Votes: The PoliticalEconomy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849 (2001); Jack M. Balkin,
Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407 (2001); Bradley
W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism,andthe DistrustofPolitics,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1781 (2001);
Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-HalfCheersforBush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2001);
Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore, Prolegomenonto an Assessment, 68 U. Cm. L. REV. 719 (2001);
Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn'tCount: The 2000 Election and the Failureofthe Rule
of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2001).
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drew from the legislative history of the Electoral Count Act of 1887, and
from the participation of Justice Bradley on the Electoral Commission of
1877. The theme of that portion of the dissent is generally an argument for
judicial restraint.' °8 At one time or another all of the current members of
the Court have argued from this premise.'0 9 It easily falls within what
Louis Seidman calls the "Official Story""' of constitutional law and how
it applies." 1 Yet, the reference to Justice Bradley sticks out; while it
purportedly supports the theme of the section, a closer inspection reveals
that it may have had other purposes. Additionally, the conclusions Justice
Breyer draws from his brief survey of the legislative history surrounding
the Electoral Count Act of 1887 are broader than the history itself would
support. It appears that the real purpose behind Justice Breyer's inclusion
of the legislative history was to provide a segue to reacquaint his
colleagues and the American public with Justice Bradley.
A. Divining the Intent Behind the ElectoralCount Act of 1887
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Breyer asserts that "the
Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility
to count electoral votes.""' 2 The considerable debates in the U.S. Congress
between 1876 and 1887 over the meaning of that amendment belie the
simplicity of this assertion. The Twelfth Amendment states cryptically,
that "The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then
be counted.""' 3 But, as one of the members of the Electoral Commission
put it so eloquently during debate in 1876, "the vote has got to be counted
108. In Part I, Justice Breyer (joined only by Justice Souter) allows for the possibility of an
equal protection violation. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (prompting debate
over labeling Bush v. Gore a 7-2 decision); compare, e.g., McConnell, supra note 107, at 660
(referring to the "7-2 decision" to reverse the Florida Supreme Court's decision), with e.g.,
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 1093 n.4; Linda Greenhouse, Learningto Live with Bush v. Gore,
4 GREEN BAG 2d 381, 381 (2001) (stating that opinion "wasn't the 7-2 remand they were hearing
about, but a 5-4 judgment for Bush..."). Justice Breyer then argues (joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Souter, and Stevens) why the majority's remedy of essentially ending all recounts and enforcing
the December 12, 2000 "safe harbor," and the concurrence's Article II argument were wrong. See
Bush, 531 U.S. at 146-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("We should get out of this area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves
nor the country any good by remaining.").
110. Louis Michael Seidman, What's So BadAbout Bush v. Gore? An Essay on Our Unsettled
Election, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 953, 958 (2001).
111. This is essentially the track Erwin Chemerinsky took in his article in the Notre Dame Law
Review. Chemerinsky, supranote 3, at 1095 ("This Article argues that Justice Breyer was right.").
112. Bush, 531 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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in the presence of the Houses. But like the cooking of a fish - you must
catch it first. So you must know what you are going to count before 'the
votes' can 'then be counted.""' 4 It would of course be absurd to say, since
the Twelfth Amendment speaks of counting the votes in front of the U.S.
Congress, that Congress should act as the canvassing board for every
precinct in every state. Bush v. Gore was not a Twelfth Amendment case
because the fish, as it were, was not yet caught (or at least it was still
flipping around on the hook). While the congressional debates envisioned
a calamity wherein two separate sets of returns emerged from a single
state, at least some members realized that the same problem would arise
if one return emerged but was challenged by the party that did not
prevail. '
Next, Justice Breyer contends that the "legislative history of the
[Electoral Count] Act makes clear its intent to commit the power to resolve
' First, a quibble:
such disputes to Congress, rather than the courts."116
Justice Breyer relies on the floor statement of Representative Caldwell,
who Breyer credits as "the Member of Congress who introduced the
[Electoral Count] Act.""' 7 Presumably, this label is included because the
statement of a bill's drafter deserves extra attention as a matter of statutory
interpretation." 8 However, Representative Caldwell did not "introduce"
the Act. In fact, the bill originated in the Senate - George Edmunds of
Vermont introduced it on December 8, 1885.119 And if the views of the
member who introduced the bill do indeed merit special attention, then it
is worth noting that Senator Edmunds thought that the "final action" in an
election "was not ajudicial, but an administrative action, subject to review,
as the rights of every other man who claims an office.., everywhere in
our States, by thejudicial tribunalsappointedto tryjudicialcontests in a
judicialway. "12 The drafter of the bill, it seems, envisioned the possibility
of the involvement of a court. Indeed, one of the objections to participation
114. 4 CONG. REc. 1882 (Mar. 22, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen).
115. See, e.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1753 (Mar. 16, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("It is a
question as to the authenticity of a return."). Obviously, if only one set of returns were sent to
Congress, it would be far less likely that a dispute over that particular slate of electors would arise;
less likely, but not impossible.
116. Bush, 531 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRIcKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE

CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 791 (2d ed. 1995).

119. S. 9, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1885); see 17 CONG. REC. 122 (Dec. 8, 1885). During the
debates before the 1876 election, Senator Edmunds endorsed sending electoral controversies to the
courts. See, e.g., 4 CONG. REC. 1694 (Mar. 14, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds) ("The
Constitution, it appears to me ... leaves it... to judicial determination if any dispute should
arise.").
120. 17 CONG. REC. 1064 (Feb. 2, 1886) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds) (emphasis added).
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by members of the Court on the Electoral Commission was not that their
involvement would damage the reputation of the judiciary, but the
possibility that the Court might concurrently hear a"conventional"judicial
challenge to the selection of electors, thereby creating a conflict of
interest. 2 '
It is true that Representative Caldwell served on the House Committee
that proposed an important amendment to the Senate Bill. The version the
House received remained silent as to what course to take should the U.S.
Congress receive two returns and should both Houses fail to agree which
was valid.' 22 The House proposed what became the tie-breaker - if the
Houses failed to agree on which set of returns was valid, then the one
certified by the governor of the state would be effective.'23 But from the
comments of Representative Caldwell, it is clear that the purpose of this
amendment was not to prevent the Court from getting involved in a
particular controversy, but instead to prevent the President of the Senate
from acting unilaterally.'24
It is also worth noting that the conference report on thefinal version of
the bill notes the reinsertion of the qualifier "lawfully" to describe the
votes certified by the state - the House Committee Report which Justice
Breyer quotes had deleted the qualifier, but it was reinserted at the
insistence of the Senate conferees, including Senator Edmunds. 2 '
Presumably, the "lawfully" qualifier was included to preserve the
possibility of judicial review to a challenge of the state proceedings.' 26
Once the fish was caught, Congress would count it; until then, the issue
remained open to multiple interpretations.

121.

4 CONG. REc. 1841 (Mar. 21, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Withers).
More than that, the judges of the Supreme Court may possibly themselves be called upon in
their judicial capacity to decide upon questions which may arise under the action which is
taken in Congress at the time the vote is counted.... [T]hat such an event is possible I think
can scarcely be denied.

Id.
122. S. 9 as amended, reprintedin 17 CONG. REc. 2387 (Mar. 16, 1886).

123. 24 Stat. 373 § 4 (1887) ("But if the two Houses shall disagree in respect of the counting
of such votes, then, and in that case, the votes of those electors whose appointment shall have been

certified by the Executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be counted.").
124. See 18 CONG. REC. 30 (Dec. 7, 1886) (remarks of Rep. Caldwell) ("The passage of this
bill will settle all questions which have arisen from time to time as to the electoral count. It will
decide, first, that the power to count the vote is not in the President of the Senate.").
125. See 18 CONG. REC. 668 (Jan. 14, 1887) (reprinting conference report).

126. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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B. Divining the "Facts" Relevant to the ElectoralCommission of 1877
Justice Breyer's dissent then moves in reverse chronological order back
to the Electoral Commission of 1877. This body, he informs, proved to the
U.S. Congress in 1887 that judges should not be asked to resolve a
contested election, 27 and the ultimate proof-in-the-pudding was the
performance of Justice Bradley (who is, again, the only named member of
the Commission in Justice Breyer's account). Here, Breyer offers as a
"fact" "that the participation in the work of the electoral commission by
five Justices,28 including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process
'
legitimacy."'
Justice Breyer does not offer his criteria for determining whether or not
a process was legitimate. If he means that only decisions fully accepted by
everyone are legitimate, then the Electoral Commission was, of course, a
failure. The Democrats on the Commission dissented, those in the House
attempted to block the counting of the vote, 129 and Hayes was called by
many "Rutherfraud," "Old 8 to 7,""13o and "his fraudulency." But surely
Justice Breyer does not mean that pleasing all the people all the time is a
necessary component of legitimacy - after all, the celebrated opinions of
Brown v. Board of Education3 and Roe v. Wade' would fail this test.'3 3
If by "legitimacy" one means that enough people accepted the outcome so
that it could take effect, then the Electoral Commission was a legitimate
device, and the participation of the Justices was the cornerstone of that
legitimacy, for without their inclusion, neither party would have supported
the plan, and the country would not have gone along with the decision of
the Commission.'3 4 And this was despite the fact that the U.S. Congress
127. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 57 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. Some members tried a similar tactic in 2000, but Vice President Gore refused to
recognize them when certifying the returns of the electoral college since the objections were not
signed by a senator. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H-34-36 (Jan. 6, 2001).
130. See, e.g., Terry Madonna & Richard Glenn, The Compromise of 1877: Insights on the
Resolution of Electoral Disputes, available at http://muweb.millersville.edu/-politics/ 1876.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
132. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
133. Of course, the consensus now is that Brown was rightly decided; there is no such
consensus on Roe. One can expect a continuing lack of consensus on the Court's decision in Bush
v. Gore; indeed, if the lessons from 1876 hold true, there will always be two versions of what the
Court did in the 2000 election.
134. See supratext accompanying notes 103-05; see, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 4 1, at 150
("The plan [the Electoral Commission bill] contained was ingeniously contrived to avoid the
appearance of giving so much as a hair's weight of advantage to one party or the other.").
Immediate popular reaction, while admittedly mixed, evinced a feeling of relief that the ordeal was

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 15

failed to come up with a solution for a deadlocked electoral count until
after such a deadlock occurred. Perhaps the strongest argument about the
"illegitimacy" of the Electoral Commission was the complaint that
Congress waited until a controversy arose to enact legislation to deal with
the electoral count dilemma.13 Finally, if "legitimacy" is the inverse of
"illegitimacy," and the latter occurred if, for example, it were proven that
Justice Bradley voted Hayes' way for monetary gain, then the evidence
does not support the label, as Breyer grudgingly admits.' 36
Ostensibly, Breyer is relying upon the historical legacy of the Electoral
Commission to support his legislative history argument about 3 U.S.C. §
5. This is "law office history"'3 7 taken to the extreme. It is worth noting
that Justice Souter, no stranger to the inclusion of tangentially-related
historical references,138 decided not to join this part of the dissent.'39 In the
end, the "fact" that Breyer offers boils down to nothing more than his take
on the effectiveness of the Electoral Commission. Ironically, Richard
Posner seems to agree with Breyer's reading of the "facts,"' 4 ° while Bruce
Ackerman apparently thinks the electoral commission was the best

over. See, e.g., Thomas Nast, Our Uncle Going to Take a Rest, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 7, 1877, at
276, available at http://elections.harpweek.com/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2003).
135. See, e.g., 18 CONG. REc. 75 (Dec. 9, 1886) (remarks of Rep. Herbert).
No question has been more thoroughly and ably discussed in the last ten years than that
involved in this bill - the counting of the electoral vote. Eleven years ago the country was
on the eve of civil war because we had adisputed Presidential election and no law provided
under which the count could be made. The Electoral Commission was resorted to. The
country submitted to the result, but was never satisfied with it. It was the natural, and perhaps
the inevitable result. The country never will be satisfied in any political case with a
temporary expedient or device under a law passed at the moment, after parties had taken
sides on the question. The party losing under such circumstances will naturally believe it has
been cheated. The people of this country are law-loving and law-abiding, but they want laws
passed before cases arise, and not with reference to any special case that has arisen.
Id.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 148-49.
137. Alfred Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119, 157-58;
see also Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of
History, 13 J.L. & POL. 809, 809-10, 889-90 (1997).
138. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1654-62 (2002).
139. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 144 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. POSNER, supra note 107, at 216 ("The resolution of the 1876 deadlock was not painless
- why otherwise did Congress enact [the Electoral Count Act] a decade later to resolve such
deadlocks in an entirely different fashion?").
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solution to a complex problem,14" ' although, Posner thinks Bush v. Gore
was rightly decided whereas Ackerman thinks it a travesty.' 42 If anything,
this proves that trying to derive the "fact" of the Electoral Commission's
legitimacy is a futile endeavor - does the "fact" that opinion polls taken
after December 12, 2000 indicate that public approval of the U.S. Supreme
Court remains high' 43 establish that Justice Breyer's judicial restraint
argument is wrong? To the extent that Breyer's argument rests on the
"fact" of legitimacy, the answer would appear to be yes.
C. Divining the Significance of Justice Bradley's Role
Given the weaknesses in Justice Breyer's review of the legislative
history, the only purpose the first half of the latter part of his dissent serves
is to tee up the historical reference to Justice Bradley. Several odd things
about this reference to Justice Bradley merit attention. First, Breyer
introduces the reader to "Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley."' 44 The
full name and title'45 (with middle initial no less!) stands in marked
contrast to the traditional "Justice Bradley" treatment ordinarily found in
Court opinions on the rare occasions when there is a need to refer to him
by name."' To be sure, Breyer wrote his dissent under intense time
constraints, so that could explain the awkward introduction. But given that
the paragraph makes it clear that some "Supreme Court Justices"'4 7 sat on
the Electoral Commission, the full title indicates that something more is
going on.

141. Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy ofa ConstitutionalCoup, LONDON REv. BOOKS, Feb. 8,2001,
at 3-4. Jeffrey Rosen also sees a parallel between Bush v. Gore and the Electoral Commission of
1877; but his assessment is that the Commission was a failure that should have led the Court to
deny Bush's petition for a writ of certiorari. Jeffrey Rosen, Misjudge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov.
27, 2000.
142. Compare POSNER, supra note 107, at 213-17 (criticizing Ackerman's take on Bush v.
Gore), with Ackerman, supra note 141, at 4 ("The Court could have given an opinion that made
legal sense."); Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48.
143. See Seidman, supra note 110, at 960-61 & nn. 15-18 (citing polling data on the Court after
Bush v. Gore); but see Michael C. Dorf, When Elections Go Bad: The Law ofDemocracy and the
PresidentialElection of 2000. By Samuel Issacharoff,Pamela S. Karlan, andRichard H. Pildes,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1279, 1296 n.70 (2001) (citing Gallup poll data revealing partisan split in how
the public views the Court in the wake of Bush v. Gore).
144. Bush, 531 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. And not even the correct title - Associate Justice.
146. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 795 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the "revered Justice
Bradley").
147. Bush, 531 U.S. at 156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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In the dissent, Justice Breyer also tells the reader that "Justice Bradley
immediately became the subject of vociferous attacks."' 48 What is the
purpose of including this information? References to criticisms of
individual justices are not commonplace. in the United States Reports.
Presumably, Breyer's point is that negative publicity for a member of the
Court is an appropriate factor to weigh in the judicial restraint analysis.
Breyer also raises some of the accusations against Bradley (the railroad
interests, and the change in position) but does not directly refute them,
stating instead that "[m]any years later, Professor Bickel concluded that
Bradley was honest and impartial.' 49
The "[m]any years later" comment is also unusual: it implies that until
Professor Bickel published his book, everyone thought that Bradley had
acted improperly. And, as a matter of historiography, it is inaccurate:
Bickel's book 5 ° cites the work of Charles Fairman; the latter is the
historian who concluded that Bradley was impartial and outlined what the
"great question" for Bradley was."' In fact, Bickel's account hardly
"concludes" that Bradley was impartial; of Bradley's protestations that
political party considerations played no part in his decision, Bickel says
only, "[b]elieve it now we must.""' The decision to speak through Bickel
might stem from a desire to draw The Least DangerousBranch into the
dissenting opinion - Breyer goes on to argue that Bush v. Gore fails
Bickel's test for when the Court should refrain from deciding an issue, 153
but it might also reflect a conscious decision on the part of Justice Breyer
to leave open the question of whether Justice Bradley acted properly in
1877. "For present purposes," he concludes, the only fact that needs
establishing is that the inclusion of members of the Court on the Electoral
Commission did not "lend that process legitimacy."154 Does Justice Breyer
have "future purposes" in mind for the history of Justice Bradley and the
Commission? Part IV postulates that he does indeed.

148. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. Id.(Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
150. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
15 1. See id.at 185 & n. 115 (citing Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley, in MR. JUSTICE 69,
83 (A. Dunham & P.B. Kurland eds., 1956)).
152. BICKEL, supra note 150, at 185.
153. Bush, 531 U.S. at 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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IV. THE

REAL LEGAL REALISM: AN ARGUMENT FROM REPUTATION

Commentators on Bush v. Gore agree that the decision lends itself to
critical legal studies interpretations.' The reason it does so is rather
obvious: the Court divided 5-4, and the five who voted for Bush (pun
intended) are Republican appointees.' 56 The resurgence of critical legal
studies stems largely from the two majority opinions that appear, to many,
devoid of legitimate legal argument,' 57 although some commentators have
noted that the dissenting opinions are equally susceptible to this
criticism.'58 Critics see the majority opinion as irreconcilable with prior 54 federalism decisions."' This "doctrinal inversion"' 6 ° of a majority of
Justices who normally defer to states voting for federal intervention and
a dissenting bloc that normally endorses expansive federal power calling
for restraint and deference to the state certainly provides a convenient
platform from which to conclude that legal arguments are merely window
dressing for political outcomes. A similar charge was leveled against
Republicans and Democrats during the 1876 electoral crisis, when the
normally nationalist Republicans argued that upholding states' rights
forbade Congress - or the Electoral Commission - from looking behind
the certificates of the electors, while the rabidly-states' rights Democrats
declared uncharacteristically that Congress possessed the power to go
behind the returns.' 61 The current interpretations of Bush v. Gore begin
with the legal reasoning of the opinion itself, dissect that reasoning,
determine that the reasoning is faulty, and then conclude that politics, and
not law, is driving the train.'62
While there is undoubtedly merit to this line of analysis, the "real"
legal realism lies in Justice Breyer's dissent. The reference to Justice
Bradley may have been a thinly-veiled appeal to Justice Kennedy to
rethink his vote, not on the basis of any principled legal reason, but
155. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore, An Anticipatory Intellectual
History,90 GEO. L.J. 113, 113 (2001); see also, e.g., Ackerman, supranote 141, at 48; Greenhouse,
supra note 108, at 383; Seidman, supra note 110, at 1005-26.
156. Of course, two of the dissenters are also Republicans, but this is explained away by
labeling the Justices "conservatives" and "liberals" rather than by attaching party affiliations to
their jurisprudence.
157. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 143, at 1279 (quoting a colleague as saying, "It must be very
discouraging trying to teach constitutional law.., when it's so obviously made up.").
158. E.g., Seidman, supra note 110, at 956-57, 960.
159. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 107, at 1434; Klarman, supra note 3, at 1725.
160. Abramowicz & Steams, supra note 107, at 1849.
161. See BARNARD, supra note 39, at 338; WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 21.
162. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 3, at 1723-47 (analyzing the case and concluding that "the
Bush result can be explained only in terms of the conservative majority's partisan political
preferences").
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because history would tarnish his reputation if he failed to do so. This Part
hypothesizes why Justice Breyer made this argument and why his appeal
ultimately failed to convince. It also analyzes the significance of the
appearance of this type of argument in a written opinion.
A. The Appeal of the Argument From Reputation
Many assume that Justice Kennedy authored the per curiam opinion.163
It is hardly a bold assertion to say the outcome of Bush v. Gore hinged on
his vote. 64 Obviously, he did notjoin Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas in embracing Article II as an "additional ground" for
reversing the Florida Supreme Court.'65 His vote (and that of Justice
O'Connor)'6 6 on the equal protection issue proved decisive in the case.
Given his unpredictability on issues of constitutional law,' 67 it seems likely
that both the conservative and liberal justices thought they could win him
to their side. By one account, Justice Kennedy remained undecided on the
issue until the last moment, causing Justice Souter to lament that if he'd
had "one more day" to lobby his colleague the case would have come out
differently.'68 Regardless of the veracity of this allegation, Justice Breyer
certainly would have hoped to convince Justice Kennedy to join his view
of the case.
Why might an argument based on historical reputation resonate with
Justice Kennedy? Rumor has it that he wants to be the next Chief
Justice.' 69 If so, his reputation both current and future would be of obvious
concern. Any affront to his integrity would certainly undermine his
prospects for the Chief's spot. Justice Breyer may have had this in mind
163. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note I, at 274.
164. See, e.g., AP, O'Connor, Kennedy, Voters to Watch, TOPEKA CAP.-J., Dec. 12, 2000,
availableat http://quest. cjonline.com/stories/1 21200/sup_ 1212007354.shtml (last visited June21,
2002).
165. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
166. O'Connor reportedly gave away her position on election night, when partygoers observed
her reacting with extreme displeasure to initial reports that Gore captured Florida. See, e.g., Evan
Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars,NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000, at 46.
167. While joining the Rehnquist majority in such federalism cases as United States v. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison, Kennedy also authored more liberal opinions such as Lee v.
Weisman, and most famously staked out middle ground in the abortion debate by joining Justices
Souter and O'Connor's position in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.
168. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 284 (recounting a conversation between Justice Souter and
students from Choate prep school); but see What They Didn't Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2001, at
A28 (printing letter from Choate teacher Zachary Goodyear denying that Souter made the remarks
Kaplan attributed to him).
169. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Justice Kennedy's FutureRole Pondered,WASH. POST, June 17,
2002, at A1; Tony Mauro, Kennedy on Campaign Trail?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at 7.
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when he brought up the example of Justice Bradley. 7 ' Additionally, in a
now infamous public interview, Justice Kennedy admitted to the influence
ofpublic opinion, stating just before the PlannedParenthooddecisionwas
issued, "you don't know if you're Caesar about to cross the Rubicon or
Captain Queeg cutting your own tow-line."'' He reportedly earned the
moniker "Flipper" from that term's law clerks for changing his mind
several times over the case.' 72
Justice Kennedy's extrajudicial role in establishing the "Dialogue on
Freedom"' 73 indicates further his sensitivity to the effect public opinion
can have on the legitimacy of political and legal institutions. Justice
Breyer would therefore have cause to predict that Justice Kennedy, more
than any of the other justices, would vote in part based on how he thought
the public would react to his vote. Finally, Justice Kennedy is by now used
to casting the deciding vote on cases. It would come as no great surprise
to him to learn that he would receive the majority of the criticism (or
praise) for Bush v. Gore, despite the per curiam label on the opinion. Like
Justice Bradley, Justice Kennedy was thought to have an "open mind" on
the case before the decision came down. In his dissent, Justice Breyer
effectively reminded Justice Kennedy that an "open mind" can quickly
appear closed in the minds of many by alluding to the criticisms leveled
at Justice Bradley.' 74 By singling out one member of a commission of
fifteen in his dissent, Breyer made the point that Justice Kennedy's
reputation, more than that of any of his colleagues, would come under
heavy fire.' 75 In doing so, Breyer may have hoped to convince Justice
Kennedy that the wisest course of action would be to uphold the Florida
Supreme Court, an outcome which would favor Al Gore.

170. Although the Justice from 1876-77 who would best serve as an example would be Samuel
Miller. This ardent Republican greatly desired the Chief Justiceship, but was never selected,
perhaps due to the bitterness engendered by his role on the Electoral Commission. See William
Gillette, Samuel Miller, in II JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 14, at 1011, 1022.
171. Jeffrey Rosen, Anthony Kennedy, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1, 1992.
172. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 470 (1998).
173. See Lane, supranote 169, at Al; Mauro, supranote 169, at 7. Justice Kennedy wrote the
hypothetical for the Dialogues. ABA Dialogue on Freedom, available at http://www.abanet.org/
dialogue/whatis.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2003).
174. See, e.g., Unsafe Harbor,THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25,2000 ("Not even O'Connor and
Kennedy, the most illustrious minds in America, opened their minds.").
175. A rather prescient observation. See, e.g., id.; Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000 ("The unsigned per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore is a shabby piece of
work. Although the justices who handed the election to Bush - O'Connor and Kennedy - were
afraid to sign their names, the opinion unmasks them more nakedly than any TV camera ever
could.").
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B. Why the Argument Failed
But Justice Kennedy did not take the bait; he neither switched his vote
nor acknowledged Justice Breyer's interpretation of Justice Bradley's
legacy. In the end, the not-so-subtle attack on his reputation may have
actually pushed him further into the "conservative" camp, both in Bush v.
Gore, and beyond.
There are several reasons why Justice Kennedy could find the Justice
Bradley allusion unconvincing. Perhaps he even agreed with Justice
Breyer that the Commission did not lend any legitimacy to the electoral
crisis, but not on the reason why: if Kennedy adopted Bruce Ackerman's
view that the Justices in 1877 were not constrained by legal precedent
since they were acting in a political capacity,'76 then the illegitimacy arose
because the U.S. Constitution prohibits Justices from rendering advisory
before the Court in Bush v.
opinions, 177 an issue not (at least in his eyes)
178
Gore since it was acting as a judicial body.
Another reason has to do with the composition of the Court in 2000
vis-A-vis the Commission in 1877. While Justice Bradley found himself
envious that every other member of the Commission knew how he would
vote before arguments even started, 179 Justice Kennedy was joined in the
middle, at least to the outside observer, by Justice O'Connor. 8 ° While
Justice Bradley drew almost all of the wrath directed toward the
Commission,' 8 ' Justice Kennedy could share the blame with his centrist
colleague.
But perhaps the biggest hole in the argument from reputation, and the
one that most likely convinced Justice Kennedy that he was doing the right
thing, is that Bradley's legacy is far from established, and not altogether
negative. If Kennedy is more a student of Charles Fairman than he is 1of
82
Allan Nevins, he might embrace the comparison rather than fear it.
Consider that in 1882, Bradley wrote yet another defense of his role on the
Electoral Commission, stating:
176. See Ackerman, supra note 141, at 4.
177. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 408 (2 Dall. 409) (1792); but see In the Matter of the
President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 374 (3d Cir. 1986)
(finding that participation of a retired Justice and an active circuitjudge on an advisory commission
did not violate separation of powers principles because it did not disrupt his judicial duties).
178. But see generallyChemerinsky, supra note 3 (arguing that the case was not justiceable
for various reasons, including lack of standing). Interestingly, during the 1876 debates, some
members thought that creating a commission distinct from the Court avoided, rather than created,
the Article III problem. See, e.g., 5 CONG. REC. 1879 (Mar. 22, 1876) (remarks of Sen. Burnside).
179. See Letter from Bradley, infra note 183.
180. See AP, supra note 164; Rosen, supra note 175.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
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I want to put in a word in my own vindication. So far as I was concerned

I took the subject for consideration as a pure judicial question. I envied
the other members who all ... seemed to have no difficulty in reaching
a conclusion; whilst to me the questions raised were perplexing and
difficult in the highest degree .... So far as I am capable of judging my
own motives, I did not allow political, that is, party, consideration to have
any weight whatever in forming my conclusion. I know that is difficult for
men of the world to believe this; but I know it, and that is enough for me.
And upon careful review of the whole subject, I am still of the opinion
that my conclusion was right." 3

It is not difficult to imagine Justice Kennedy offering a similar explanation
for his vote in Bush v. Gore. Because the "facts" of Justice Bradley's
involvement in the Electoral Commission can be resolved in a manner
favorable (indeed, laudatory) to the Justice, the argument from reputation
is not nearly as effective as it could be."s4
By trying to associate Justice Kennedy with the negative version of
Justice Bradley, Justice Breyer may have further alienated a Justice to
whom the more liberal members of the Court must often turn.'85 Attacking
his reputation, even when doing so through the guise of what many
consider obscure and ancient legal history, is hardly an effective lobbying
technique (and offers another reason why Justice Souter did notjoin in this
part of the dissent).
C. The Significance of the Real Legal Realism in Bush v. Gore
This Article argues that Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Bush v.
Gore

-

at least in part -

distills into a one-on-one lobbying effort

directed at Justice Kennedy. This, in and of itself, is not particularly
183. Letter from Joseph P. Bradley to Henry B. Dawson, esq., Oct. 28, 1882, reprintedin
FAIRMAN, supra note 19, at 194.

184. See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen's allegory to discredited Chief Justice Roger Taney in
his critique of the decision. Rosen, supra note 175. Rosen directs this attack toward Justice Scalia,
who is a lot less likely to be impressed by reputational arguments than Justice Kennedy.
185. For example, well before the Court heard argument on the University of Michigan
affirmative action policies, Akhil Reed Amar published an essay designed to provide Justice
Kennedy with a rationale for upholding the endorsement of affirmative action in education outlined
by Justice Lewis F. Powell in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). Akhil Reed Amar, Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 515, 531-37
(1997). While Amar did not convince Justice Kennedy that the Michigan programs were
constitutional, Justice Kennedy did endorse Justice Powell's stance in Bakke. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411,
2428-29 (2003). Amar's appeal to Justice Kennedy's sense of equality may, however, have helped
solidify the Justice's approach to another so-called "liberal" issue. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
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noteworthy. It comes as little surprise to learn that Justices try to influence
each other by any means necessary. A common technique is to cite the
opinion of a colleague who is later on the "wrong" side of an issue in
support of the contrary position. 86 But this is done within the context of
the "official story"' 87 of how the law works: the game is to catch the other
side in its own jurisprudential noose, not to make appeals to reputation.
Of course, extrajudicial lobbying by a sitting Justice is also not unheard
88
of. ' For example, Chief Justice Earl Warren earned the praise of many for
his ability to convince Justice Stanley Reed, a southerner, to join the
opinion in Brown.'89 Instead of relying on the strength of his legal position,
Justice Warren relied on an "it's good for the country" approach. 90 It was
also, in part, an argument based on reputation, for Justice Warren's pitch
implied that if Reed dissented, he would be partly to blame for any
southern resistance to integration. 9 ' Another example: part of Chief
Justice Marshall's greatness stems from his ability to garner unanimous
opinions, a practice made easier by his insistence that all the members of
the Court board at the same location.192 Presumably some of the discourse
that took place there had less to do with law, and more to do with
collegiality or other topics.
The significance of Breyer's Bush v. Gore dissent is less a matter of the
type of argument made than the forum for making the argument. As Part
III of this Article demonstrates, the attempt to reference Justice Bradley as
part of an argument from legislative history fails. What is left is an
argument from reputation - the type of argument that until now remained

186. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (citing the dissenting
opinions of Justices Souter and Breyer to establish the proposition that "[s]even Justices of the
Court agree that there are constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme
dissenting) (citing Kennedy's concurrence
at 142 (Ginsburg, J.,
Court that demand a remedy"); id.
in US.Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) to argue that the Court should defer
to the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the state law question).
187. Seidman, supra note 110, at 958.
188. See Benjamin C. Block, Note, The StrangeCareerof VA WA: ChiefJusticeRehnquistand
the Shiftfrom "Political" to "Constitutional" Federalism 1990-2000, 16 J.L. & POL. 499 (Spring
2001) (discussing the influence of Chief Justice Rehnquist on the wording of the Violence Against
Women Act).
189. See Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made it andHow Much Did it Matter,
83 GEO. L.J. 433, 443-45 (1994).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Working Life ofthe MarshallCourt,1815-1835,70 VA.
L. REV. 1, 5, 34-35 (1984).
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hidden behind the scenes.' 9 3 It may well turn out that the appearance of this
type of argument on the page of the United States Reports will be an
anomaly. For one thing, arguments from historical reputation are difficult
to make, because historical assessments of individuals rarely reach a
consensus. The failure of the argument and its possible negative
consequences' 94 also counsel against repeat performances. But the greatest
danger is that the real legal realism, when it occupies the very same ground
as the legal reasoning it belies, will debunk the notion that cases are
decided on their legal merits. Ironically, Justice Breyer lamented that the
Court "runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the Court
itself,"'' when his own opinion provides the best and clearest fodder for
critics of the judicial process.
Twice now, a combination of fate' 96 and politics has sent this country
in a search for Solomon'9 7 to decide the outcome of a presidential election.
Twice, a single justice of the U.S. Supreme Court played that role, and
twice the result lacked, for many, the wisdom and propriety of the famous
decision to split the baby."'
Michael Klarman is certainly correct to predict that "history's verdict
on [Bush v. Gore] depends more on whether public opinion ultimately
supports the outcome than on the quality of the legal reasoning or the
craftsmanship of the Court's opinion."' 99 So, too, with history's verdict on
Justice Kennedy. Like his predecessor, Justice Bradley, Kennedy will
receive mixed reviews for his key vote that helped elect a president. The
issue is not really whether he voted out of partisan beliefs or legal
principles, for it is incredibly unlikely that anyone will ever be able to say
193. An argument from reputation is distinct from an argument forjudicial restraint. The latter
fits comfortably within the "official story" paradigm; it encompasses, for example, the issue of
whether an actual case or controversy exists.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
195. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. And/or astrology? See Mark Lerner, Election 2000, available at http://www.mcn.org/
greatbear/elect2k.html (last visited Dec. 22,2003) ("Amazingly, the election of 1876 also occurred
on November 7 and Mercury was at I Scorpio - within I degree of its station and placement 124
years later on Nov. 7,2000! In addition, the strange election of 1876 happened with Saturn (blocks;
limits; fears) motionless, having just turned stationary direct two days before the election at I+
Pisces. The most astounding link from the presidential election of 1876 to the one now concerns
Neptune. On Nov. 7, 1876, Neptune (illusions; chaos; confusion) was located at 3+ Taurus. One
Hundred and twenty-four years later (Nov. 7, 2000), Neptune had moved to 3+ Aquarius - an
exact Last Quarter Square phase ("crisis in consciousness" pattern) to Neptune from Nov. 7, 1876!
Neptune has traveled exactly three-quarters of the zodiac from Nov. 1876 to Nov. 2000."). Pretty
convincing, isn't it?
197. See Rosen, supra note 141 (quoting, of all people, Geraldo Rivera).
198. See I Kings 3:16-28.
199. Klarman, supra note 3, at 1722.
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for certain which took place. And so, over time, history will only link
Justices Bradley and Kennedy closer together.
The criticisms of the majority in Bush v. Gore, like those of the other
Justices on the Electoral Commission, will fade away until the litany of
"Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, O'Connor,
and Kennedy" reduces to "five justices, including Justice Kennedy."' °°
Will Justice Kennedy produce a letter similar to that of Justice Bradley
averring that partisan politics did not influence his decision?20 ' Will
anyone believe it? If, in another one hundred years, the Court once again
plays a role in a national election, will the allusion to either Justice
Kennedy or Bradley be enough to change a swing voter's mind? And most
importantly, if the real legal realism of Justice Breyer's dissent becomes
more commonplace on the Court, will future legal contests hinge less on
the law, and more on public opinion?

200. Cf Bush, 531 U.S. at 157 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he participation in the work of the
electoral commission by five justices, including Justice Bradley, did not lend that process
legitimacy.").
201. See Letter from Bradley, supra note 183 and accompanying text.

